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This paper explores the effects of a goods and services tax on the degree of competition in an
oligopolistic industry and identifies a new mechanism through which the tax influences
product market competition.  The analysis focuses upon the effects of the tax in a
concentrated industry and it is demonstrated that there exist circumstances under which the
tax may promote competition by rendering tacit collusion more difficult.
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Proposals to introduce a goods and services (i.e. value added) tax in Australia have a
long history.  A broad based value added tax was first proposed by the Asprey
Taxation Review Committee in 1975.
1  Thereafter, it has been championed by the
Australian Treasury and advocated at irregular intervals over the past decade by both
the Labor Party and the Liberal-National Party (Chessell (1994)).  A goods and
services tax will finally be introduced in Australia in July 2000.  Each proposal for a
goods and services tax has unleashed a wide ranging and vigorous political and
economic debate on the merits of the tax.  In general, the policy debates have focused
on issues relating to the distributional impact of the tax, the allocative effects and the
macroeconomic consequences of a switch from direct to indirect taxes (Head (1993)).
However, an issue which has been largely ignored in the literature is the impact of the
tax on the degree of competition in product markets.  In policy terms, this is clearly an
important issue.  If a goods and services tax induces greater (lesser) competition, this
in turn will influence the incidence, allocative effects and the macroeconomic impacts
of the tax.  This paper seeks to address this issue in greater detail.  In particular, we
present a model which isolates a hitherto unexplored mechanism through which a
goods and services tax may alter the degree of competition in product markets.
In contrast to the policy debates, the theoretical literature on indirect taxes has been
concerned mainly with determining the optimum design and coverage of indirect
taxes.  The conventional wisdom holds, that in a perfectly competitive economy,
efficiency considerations dictate that goods with uniform elasticities should be taxed
at the same rate (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)).  The literature further suggests that,
ceteris paribus, indirect taxes which are uniform in coverage are generally more
efficient than partial taxes levied on particular sectors of the economy.  More recent
extensions have explored the impact of such taxes under imperfect competition and
oligopoly.  For instance, Atkinson and Stgilitz (op cit) demonstrate that these basic
results are unaffected by the introduction of monopolistic competition.  In an
important development of the literature Davidson and Martin (1987) assess the effects
                                                
1  Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975).4
of various taxes in an economy with a tacitly collusive oligopolistic sector.  They
show that a value added tax may lead to greater collusion in an oligopoly if it lowers
the industry discount rate.  The tax therefore worsens the allocative distortions
resulting from oligopolistic competition.  However, as with the policy debates, none
of the theoretical literature explicitly analyses the effect of a goods and services tax on
competition in product markets.  This paper attempts to fill this gap.  It is
demonstrated that in some circumstances the tax promotes competition in
concentrated sectors of the economy.
We consider an oligopoly in which firms interact over an indefinite period of time,
and hence have an incentive to tacitly collude by restricting output levels (Friedman
(1989)).  Collusion, however, gives rise to the familiar problem that each firm has an
incentive to defect, when its rivals abide by the collusive agreement.  To prevent such
defection firms are assumed to employ the usual “grim trigger strategy”.  Specifically,
if any firm defects, its rivals simply abandon collusion and revert to the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium
2.  Clearly, this strategy will serve to deter defection if firms deviating
from the tacitly collusive path suffer future losses due to retaliation, which exceed the
immediate gains from defection.  As is well known, if the players care sufficiently
about future payoffs (i.e. have a relatively low discount rate), then this strategy
supports tacit collusion.
3  In what follows, it is assumed that the discount rate is
exogenously determined.
The analysis could be substantially complicated by introducing a variety of taxes,
intermediate goods and extending the model to a general equilibrium context.
However, we wish to argue that the existing literature has overlooked a fundamental
property of a goods and services tax in an oligopoly.  It is demonstrated that an
increase in the tax may lead to greater competition in the oligopolistic sector and
hence an expansion in output levels.  To see why, observe that an increase in the tax
rate lowers the payoffs a firm earns under both defection and tacit collusion.
                                                
2 While Cournot punishments have the virtue of simplicity, Abreu (1986) has shown  that these are not
the most severe punishments.  However, we ignore this issue since the basic results are unaffected when
there is constrained collusion as is assumed here.
3  Tirole (1990) suggests that it may be more accurate to refer to the equilibrium as being less
competitive, rather than tacitly collusive.5
However, the payoffs from collusion decline more rapidly than do the profits from
defection.  This occurs because prices are higher under collusion, hence firms pay
more tax per unit of output when they collude, than when they defect.
4  The incentive
to collude declines, and there is therefore an expansion in output levels.  Hence, the
tax acts as a device which generates competition.  An immediate implication of this
finding is that there will be an expansion in production levels which may promote
efficiency and raise consumer welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II outlines the oligopoly
model and describes the manner in which a goods and services tax affects the degree
of competition.  Section III discusses some of the empirical implications of this result
and concludes the paper.
II The Oligopolistic Sector
For simplicity the analysis is restricted to a duopoly.  Thus, there are assumed to be
two firms labeled i and j who produce a homogenous good (denoted X) and compete
using quantities as the strategic variable.  The price which consumers confront is
given by P(X, t)
5; where X = xi + xj; xi is the output of firm i ( i = 1, 2), (i ≠  j) and t is
the goods and services (i.e. value added) tax.  It is assumed that the inverse demand














 <0 (i = 1,2) (i ≠  j) (1b)
Good X is produced using two inputs denoted K and L, which are purchased in
competitive factor markets at prices v and w, respectively.  Production is assumed to
                                                
4  This outcome is driven by the same factors which lead to the familiar result that, the greater the price,
the greater the revenue per unit of output raised by a value added tax.  Similarly,  if a quantity based tax
and a value added tax affect output in the same way, the value added tax raises greater tax revenue
when price exceeds marginal cost (Varian (1992)).
5  P(X,t) is the price paid by consumers of the good.  The price received by the duopolists is therefore
P(X,t)(1- t).6
involve constant returns to scale.  The cost function of firm i (i = 1, 2) can thus be
expressed as:
Cxi = cx(v,w)xi (i = 1,2) (i ≠  j) (2)
It is assumed that cx(v,w) > 0 and that the government levies a tax at rate t > 0.  The
profit function is therefore given by:
Π i = (P(X,t)(1-t) - cx(v,w))xi (i = 1,2) (i ≠  j) (3)
Profits are concave in each firm's output: ∂
2Π i/∂ x
2
i  < 0.
For future reference we begin by defining the symmetric one-shot Cournot Nash
equilibrium output level, denoted xi
n:
xA r g i
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n; (i = 1,2) (i ≠  j).
As noted earlier it is assumed that firms interact repeatedly over an indefinite period
of time and hence have an incentive to tacitly collude by restricting output levels (see
Friedman (1989)).  Collusion, however, gives rise to the familiar problem that each
firm may defect, when its rival colludes..  Specifically, suppose that firm i (i = 1, 2)
sets some collusive output level xi
c < xi
n.  Then its rival j ≠  i maximizes its one period
profits by defecting and producing at an output level:
dd







i x ),t) (1-t) - cx(v,w)]
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j x ; superscript d denotes defection and c
collusion.
As is well established in the literature, such defection can be deterred by adopting a
credible threat of future retaliation.  We assume that firms employ the familiar “grim
trigger strategy” to deter cheating.  This strategy requires that both firms abide by the
collusive agreement so long as there is no defection.  If any firm defects, collusion is
abandoned and the firms revert to the one-shot Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  For tacit














where: r denotes the discount rate; Π i
d is defection profits, Π i
c  is collusive profits and
Π i
n is Cournot -Nash equilibrium profits.
The left hand side of (5) represents the one-period gains to a firm from defection,
while the right hand side defines the net present value of future collusive profits
foregone when the punishment is delivered.  Clearly when equation (5) is satisfied, the
discounted gains from collusion are no less than those from defection and firms
therefore have no incentive to defect.  Tacit collusion is therefore sustainable.
More formally, the most collusive sustainable level of output is defined by the




















0 ()    (i =1, 2) ( i ≠ j) (6b)
Equations (6a) and (6b) suggest that each firm chooses the most collusive output level
which is consistent with the absence of defection by its rival.  Define x j





c, as each firm's share of output at the unconstrained joint profit maximising
output level.  In what follows, we focus only on those equilibria in which the
constraint in equation (6b) binds and holds as an equality.  In the parlance of Friedman
(op cit) this is referred to as a “balanced temptation equilibrium”.  Observe that when
the constraint binds as an equality, production is at the most collusive sustainable
level.
6  For future reference we define the critical discount rate r* at which the
constraint in (6b) binds:
                                                
6 With a binding constraint it is possible to explore the impact of marginal tax changes on the incentive
to collude.  The approach adopted here and the assumption of a binding incentive compatibility
constraint is widely employed in the supergame literature.  Some examples include Davidson and










In what follows we focus only on the properties of the constrained equilibrium when
collusive output levels lie in the interval x
c
i  ∈  (
mn
ii x ,x ) (i = 1,2),  (i ≠  j).
Lemma 1 below outlines an important property of the equilibrium which is used
extensively in what follows.  The proof is in the Appendix.
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c
j  ∈  (x x j
m
j
n , )    (i = 1,2),  (i ≠  j).
Recall that Γ i represents firm i’s (relative) incentive to defect.  Lemma 1 informs us
that an increase in firm j’s output level lowers its rival’s incentive to defect.  To see
the significance of this result consider some exogenous event (say a change in taxes),
which makes defection more attractive.  Lemma 1 reveals that each firm can counter
its rival’s greater incentive to defect, by raising its own output levels.  This is because
each firms' incentive to defect is negatively related to its rival’s output level.  Hence,
in equation (6a) each firm sets output levels to maximize collusive profits subject to
the condition that its rival does not defect.  The solution to this problem yields the
most collusive sustainable output level.
Having outlined the manner in which output levels are determined, we now
investigate the effects of varying the tax rate.  Lemma 2 reveals that higher taxes make
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This result can be seen to arise from the following intuitive argument.  Recall that,
ceteris paribus, collusion is only feasible if future collusive payoffs are sufficiently
high.  An increase in taxes, lowers the scope for earning future collusive profits.
Firms therefore have a greater incentive to defect and this makes collusion less
attractive.  More formally, Lemma 2 suggests that when the tax rate is increased,9
collusive payoffs decline more rapidly than do defection payoffs.
7  This occurs
because prices are higher under collusion so that, on the margin firms pay more tax
per unit of output under collusion, than when they defect.
An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is that an increase in the  tax leads to a less
collusive equilibrium with higher output levels.  This result is proved in the Appendix
and summarized in the following Proposition.
Letxi
c  be the solution to the problem in (6a) and (6b). Then:





  > 0.
Intuitively, this outcome reflects the fact that in a repeated game a value added tax has
two effects.  First there is the usual cost effect.  The tax drives a wedge between the
price paid by buyers and that received by sellers.  It therefore lowers effective demand
and leads to a decline in output levels.  However, in an infinitely repeated game the
tax also has a strategic effect.  By lowering the relative payoffs from collusion, the tax
increases the incentive to defect and leads to a more competitive equilibrium, with
higher output levels.  Proposition 1 reveals that the strategic effects outweigh the cost
effects.  This suggests that a value added tax imposed on a tacitly collusive industry
may partially correct oligopolistic price distortions and promote allocative efficiency.
III Conclusions
This paper has analyzed a hitherto unexplored mechanism through which a goods and
services tax may influence the degree of competition in an oligopoly.  It was
demonstrated that in a repeated oligopoly where there is constrained tacit collusion,
such a tax induces firms to expand output levels.  This result follows from the fact that
when firms tacitly collude, they set higher prices than under defection.  Hence, more
tax is paid on the marginal unit of output under collusion than under defection.  The
tax therefore lowers the relative payoffs from collusion and leads to a more
                                                
7   This can also be verified from the following: ∂Π
d/∂ t  > ∂Π
c/∂ t|  and ∂Π
n/∂ t  > ∂Π
c/∂ t| .10
competitive equilibrium with higher output levels.  This suggests that the tax may
have the surprising effect of encouraging competition and promoting efficiency.  This
issue has been ignored in both policy and theoretical discussions of the goods and
services tax.  The results suggest that economies which are dominated with
concentrated industries  are most likely to experience the competitive efficiency gains
identified in this paper.  Moreover, this finding may partly explain the ambiguous
results found in econometric tests of the macroeconomic effects of a switch from
direct to indirect taxes (Porterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986), Damania and
Madsen (1996)).  For instance, the regressions reported in Damania and Madsen
(1996) reveal that a revenue neutral shift from direct to indirect taxes induces an
output expansion in some OECD countries, but not others.  The results presented in
this paper suggest that the mixed results could derive from the competitive effects of
indirect taxes in concentrated sectors.  These effects could be empirically estimated by
including average industry concentration as an explanatory variable to proxy for the
degree of collusion.
8  This appears to be an issue which warrants further empirical
research.
                                                                                                                                           
8  It is, however, recognised that it is difficult to obtain consistent data on concentration measures across
OECD economies.11
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1






 ≥  0). Then a decline in output levels by
firm j does not induce its rival to defect.  However, since output levels exceed the
joint profit maximizing level x








 ≥  0, the reduction in output is sustainable.  This, however,
contradicts the assumption that x
c
j  is the level of output at which the constraint in (6b)







Proof of Lemma 2:
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In a constrained equilibrium we have:
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Comparison of (A5) and (A6) reveals that:
d nn cc d c c c n
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Proof of Proposition 1:







































dt ++ = 0 (A9)
Solving:
cc c
ij j i j i
cc cc
jj ii ji ij
( / t)(( / x ) ( / x )) dx
dt ( / x )(( / x ) ( / x )(( / x ))
∂Γ ∂ ∂Γ ∂ − ∂Γ ∂
=
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  >0  (A10)
To ensure that the system is stable it is supposed that the denominator:
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Differentiating (A3):
dc cc
ij ij dc i
ii cc c
jj j
P(x ,x ) P(x ,x ) 1






(where the sign of (A11) follows from Lemma 1).  Similarly:
cc
ji j cc c
ij j x cc
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(A12)
Noting that in a symmetric equilibrium 
cc
ij xx = :
                                                                                                                                           











c (,) (,) <  and






















(1 )(P(x , x )(1 t) c )
r



















 > 0 iff:





ij x i c
j
P ( x, x) ( 1 t ) c
ˆ r
P(x ,x )





−− + − −
∂
(A14)
Clearly since net collusive price must exceed marginal cost for production to occur,
cc
ij x P(x ,x )(1 t) c −> .  Moreover equation (4b) implies that:
dc d
ij dc d i
ij x i d
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xx
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∂∂
 = 0.  Since collusive price must
exceed the price under defection (i.e. 
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ij P(x ,x )) then it follows that:
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 < 0.  Thus the denominator of (A14) is
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then (A14) always holds.  Finally by Lemma 2  i /t ∂Γ ∂  > 0.  Hence the numerator of
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